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SOME REFLECTIONS ON METHOD AND POLICY IN

THE CROWDED HOUSE OF EUROPEAN PATENT LAW
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
Justine Pila*

ABSTRACT
The patent regimes of several countries face an interplay of different
obligations today which has made it difficult to discern the methodology
adopted in answering questions of patentability. Consider India, where
the regime witnesses the tussle between obligations under domestic
legislation and Fundamental Rights, and those imposed by the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Harmonization
of these competing obligations raises important questions of an appropriate
methodology, the absence of which would reduce the intricatecomplexities
into an apparentjumble. In this article, the authortakes up this issue in the
European context, specifically positing herarguments against the backdrop
of the debate surrounding the exclusion of natural phenomenon from
patentabilityin Europe. It is argued that the European setting witnesses a
lack of an appropriatemethodology to determine the limits of patent law,
which has rendered the inevitableconvergence aroundsome basic principles
rather unsatisfactoryand incoherent.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the United States (US) patent system is widely accepted as
being to promote the progress of the useful arts, consistent with the terms of the
constitutional clause by which Congress is empowered to "securelforlimited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'

According to the US Supreme Court, this "clause is both a grant of power and a
limitation" on congressional power in the field of intellectual property (IP),2 a
view which explains its widespread treatment as the reference point for assessing
substantive principles of US patent (as well as copyright) law?
This treatment of the US constitutional clause in national (US) patent
jurisprudence raises important questions regarding the appropriate means for
assessing the legal and normative legitimacy of non-US patent law principles. For
1

Article 1, § 8, The United States Constitution (empowering Congress to make laws
"To promote the Progressof Science and useful Arts, by securingfor limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;).As Justice
Stevens remarked in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 US23 (2010) [US Supreme Court], "[nlumerous
scholars have suggested that the term "useful arts" was widely understood to encompass the
fields that we would now describe as relating to technology or "technological arts".

2

Graham v. John Deere Co of Kansas City, 383 US 1, 5 (1996) [US Supreme Court].
With respect to patent law see, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242 (1832) [US
Supreme Court] (patent "laws which are passed to give effect to this Iconstitutionall
to be construed in the spirit in which they have been made"); KSR
purpose ought ...
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 550 US 398 (2007) [US Supreme Court] (Kennedy J., for the
Court: "The results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the
patent laws. Were it otherwise, patents might stifle rather than promote the progress of useful
arts."); S. Chenette, "Maintaining the Constitutionalityof the Patent System", HASTINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY, 35 (2008), 221-62; P. J. Heald & S. Sherry, "Implied
Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual PropertyClause as an Absolute Constraint
on Congress", UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW, (2000) 1119-97; all US Patent Acts
before 1870 (which had the express purpose of "promoting the progress of the useful
arts"). With respect to copyright law see, e.g., Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service
Co. 499 US 349 (1991) [US Supreme Court] (O'Connor J.,for the Court, describing
the principle that "much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others without
compensation" as "a constitutional requirement";the primary objective of copyright as
being "[t]o Promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts").

3
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example, adopting the US approach in Europe might lead one to have regard to
the Treaty from which the European Union (EU) derives its patent authority and
assess the resulting law with reference to its necessity to achieve the purpose for
which that authority is conferred. 4 However, this would be problematic for at least
two reasons. One is that the European patent system is not a federal system in which
the EU occupies the role of federal legislator, and the second is that the particular
end to which the EU is empowered is the provision of uniform patent protection,
which, when considered in isolation at least, is a manifestly unsuitable basis for
assessing substantive European patent law principles. Hence the problem which US
jurisprudence underlines, which is essentially one of methodology, namely, what
is the appropriate method for establishing the limits of European patent law? The
aim of this article is to consider that problem with reference to the exclusion from
patentability of natural phenomena. It will be argued that in the crowded house of
European patent law, "substantive convergence" around principles is inevitable but
unsatisfactory: it will generally be the product of complex institutional dynamics as
much as principled policy making, and in the absence of unified methodology and
policy will fail to ensure coherence or consistency within the European patent system.
This argument has evident implications outside of Europe, where countries
are subject to their own legal harmonization pressures. As the ongoing litigation
in Novartis v. Union of India demonstrates,5 those pressures are particularly acute
in India, which is caught between a tradition of granting limited patent rights in
support of local industry, and an obligation to strength those rights in support of
4

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union O.J. C.
83/01 (March 30, 2010) Art. 118 ('In the context of the establishment andfunctioning of
the internal market, the European Parliamentand the Council, acting in accordancewith the
ordinary legislativeprocedure,shall establish measuresfor the creationof Europeanintellectual
property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the
Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation,coordination and
supervision arrangements. The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative
procedure, shall by means of regulations establish language arrangementsfor the European
intellectualproperty rights. The Council shall act unanimously after consultingthe European

5

Parliament."),previously Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Establishment of the
European Community OJ. C. 325/33 (December 24, 2002) Art. 95. On their equivalence
see House of Lords European Union Committee, "European Union - Tenth Report"
HL. Paper 62-1 (February 26, 2008) ch. 1-5, [9.19]-[9.24] (describing Art. 118 as "a
restatement of existing powers", albeit one that "marks a statement of political intent
and a commitment to achieving the Community patent").
In Novartis v. Union of India, a foreign company, Novartis, is challenging the TRIPScompatibility of Indian law following the decisions of the Madras High Court (Novartis
v. Union of India (2007)4 MLJ 1153) [Madras High Court] [Hereinafter, "Novartis"]and
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (.P.A.B., June 26,2009) that its life-saving cancer
drug, Gleevec, is not patentable under Indian patent. The case is currently before the
Indian Supreme Court.

Some Reflections on Method and Policy in the Crowded House
foreign industry under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).6 Hence the relevance of the argument above, which is to
validate the view of the Indian Legislature and courts regarding the scope which
that obligation leaves for the persistence of national policy and methodology.

II. THE

PATENTABILITY OF NATURAL PHENOMENA AND
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW

The fouhdational principles of European patentability are contained in the
Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for
8
Inventions 7 (S.P.C.), on which the Convention on the Grant of European Patents
(E.P.C.) is also based. Article 1 S.P.C. establishes the obligation of Contracting States
to grant patents "forany inventions which are susceptibleof industrialapplication,which
are new and which involve an inventive step". Article 2 S.P.C. creates exceptions to this
for "inventions the publicationor exploitationof which would be contraryto ordrepublic
or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely
becauseit is prohibitedby a law or regulation",and "plantor animal varietiesor essentially
biological processesfor the production of plants or animals" excluding "micro-biological
processes and the products thereof'. Both provisions have an E.P.C. counterpart Article 1, S.P.C. in Article 52(1), E.P.C., and Article 2, S.P.C. in Article 53(a) and
(b) - the only differences of current importance being that Article 52(2) E.PC.
defines an "invention" within the meaning of Article 52(1) to exclude "discoveries
as such" (inter alia), and that Article 53(a), E.P.C. clarifies that an invention is
...
not to be excluded from patentability on orderpublic or morality grounds "merely
because it is prohibitedby law or regulationin some or all of the Contracting States"
(emphasis added).
For the first 21 years of their co-existence, the S.P.C. and E.P.C. were the
only operative European instruments concerned with substantive principles of

6

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31 (April 15, 1994, 33 IJL.M. 81).

According to its Preamble, the purpose of TRIPS is "to reduce distortionsand impediments

to internationaltrade, ... promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property

ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectualproperty rights do
rights, and ...
not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade" by (inter alia) introducing "new rules
and disciplinesconcerning ... the provision of adequatestandardsand principles concerning

the availability,scope and use of trade-relatedintellectual property rights".
7
8

(Strasbourg, November 27, 1963) E.T.S. 47.
(Munich, October 5,1973) 13 I.L.M. 268 (as amended).
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patentability.' This gave the body responsible for implementing them - the E.P.C.created European Patent Office (E.P.O.) - considerable freedom to fashion the
values of the emerging European system. An important landmark in that regard
was HOWARD FLOREYiRelarin,1 involving an application for a patent for a D.N.A.
sequence encoding for H2-relaxin which had been isolated from the human body for
the first time using known recombinant techniques. The application was opposed
on the ground that the sequence was a "discovery" the protection of which would
confer excessive rights on the applicant, as well as concede the patentability of
other "discoveries" such as "the moon (after the Americans landed on it in 1969), 'Otzi'
(a mummified, around 5,000-year-old man found in ice in the Italian/AustralianAlps),
or a new animal found in some remote area"." This argument was rejected by the
E.P.O.'s Opposition Division with reference to a distinction between the acts of
discoveringa naturally occurring substance and isolating the substance from its
natural environment. While the former did not result in an invention, the latter
did, by reason of the technical nature of all acts of isolation and thus (it was said)
of all isolated phenomena. It followed that provided an isolated phenomenon
satisfied the other requirements of patentability it would be capable of supporting
a European patent. It also followed that the scope of protection conferred by such a
patent would extend beyond the method of isolation to the isolated phenomenon
itself as the "invention" for which the patent had been granted. To the extent that
this would give the patentee rights beyond the method which he had devised, it
was regarded by the Division as "perfectly justified" in light of the phenomenon not
having previously been made available to the public in a form in which it could be
used." The decision broke with earlier United Kingdom (UK) authority13 including
in its premise that the purpose of the system is to reward patentees, rather than
to confer the consideration required by the social contact which a patent (on one
view) represents.
Equally as a matter of doctrinal law, the importance of Howard Florey for
the European patent system went beyond its restrictive view of the discoveries
exclusion to its conception of patentability in general as appropriately extending
to any subject matler which is technical in nature. That conception is also apparent
from the E.P.O.'s interpretation of Article 53(b) E.EC. 14 and from the second part
9
10
11
12

The Convention for the European patent for the common market (C.P.C.), 76/76/EEC
(December 15, 1975) has never been ratified.
HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin [1995] EPOR541 (Opp. Div.). [Hereinafter "HowardFlorey"l
Howard Florey [5.4].
See Howard Florey [5.31.

13

See, e.g., American Cyanamid Company (Dann's)Patent, [1971] RPC 425 [House of Lords,

Lord Diplock diss].
14

See G1/98 (NOVARTIS/Transgenic plant systems), [200) EPOR 303; G_1/08 (TOMATOES!
State of Israel), [2011] OJ EPO [Enlarged Board of Appeal].
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of the Division's opinion in Howard Florey concerning the public ordre/morality
exclusion. In the opponent's argument, D.N.A. sequences represent "life" the
patenting of which is immoral and therefore prohibited by Article 53(a) E.P.C. The
Division rejected this argument, finding instead that D.N.A. is "a chemical substance
which carriesgenetic information and can be used as an intermediatein the production of
proteinswhich may be medically useful",'5 and that "the opponents' general assertions
concerning the alleged intrinsicimmorality of patenting human genes ... arefounded on
the premise that there is an overwhelming consensus among the ContractingStates that the
patentingof human genes is abhorrentand hence prohibited under Article 53(a) [which]
assumption isfalse."'16 For the E.P.O. to conduct its own enquiry into the morality of
gene protection would be inappropriate, it said, having regard to the ambiguity of
public views on the issue, and its limited remit to decide questions of law rather
than morality."' Consistent with this, and the E.P.O. Boards' repeated finding
that exceptions to the general principle of patentability contained in Article 53(1)
"are to be narrowly construed", 8 the Division rejected the opponents' Article 53(a)
argument. The earlier decision in HARVARD/Onco-Mouse' 9 - that the exclusion
provided a mechanism for weighing the benefits and ethical risks represented by
an invention - was all but rejected.
Howard Florey was decided nearly 20 years ago, four years before the
EU entered the patent field with Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection
of hiotechnological inventions (Biotech Directive)." Building on the E.P.C. as
implemented nationally, and reflecting its aim of harmonizing European patent
standards, 21 the premise of the Directive is the Howard Florey distinction between
technical (and patentable) acts of isolation and non-technical (and unpatentable)
acts of discovery.22 According to Article 3(2), for example, "(bliologicalmaterialwhich
15
16
17
18

Howard
Howard
Howard
Howard

Florey.
Florey [6.4.31.
Florey [6.4.4]-[6.5].
Florey [6.2.11. In the Division's opinion, this was presented as explaining

and justifying the view of the exclusion "as a measure to ensure that patents would not be
grantedfor inventions which would universally be regarded as outrageous" such as, it was
suggested, a letter bomb.

19

See T19/90 (HARVARD/Onco-Mouse) [1990] EPOR 501 [Technical Board of Appeal].

20

OJ L. 213 (July 30, 1998) 13-21.

21

See Recitals 3, 5-7, 8.

22

The distinction is also recognized in US law. See, e.g., AMP v. USPTO (C.A.F.C., July

29, 2011) (reversing the district court's decision that isolated D.N.A. molecules are
products of nature and therefore incapable of supporting a patent on the ground that
"the molecules as claimed do not exist in nature" (p. 8). As reasoned by the court (at pp.
43-44), "... in nature, isolated D.N.A.s are covalently bonded to such other materials. Thus,
when cleaved, an isolated D.N.A. molecule is ... a distinct chemical entity.")
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is isolatedfrom its naturalenvironment or produced by means of a technical process may
be the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature". And similarly
according to Article 5, while "Itjhe human body, at the various stages of its formation
and development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements" are unpatentable, "a
n element isolatedfrom the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical
process" is patentable, "even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a
naturalelement".
In other respects, however, the Directive reflects markedly different values
from those of Howard Florey.For example, its basis is a view of the European patent
system as existing to support industry and research rather than technology per
se,23 and as needing to accommodate "general principles of Community law", viz.,
such "fundamental rights" as are guaranteed by European instruments or "the
constitutional traditionscommon to Member States".? Of special importance in the
Directive's recitals are the principles of health care and environmental protection,
freedom of science, non-discriminatory patent protection, 25 and the dignity and
integrity of the person "in line with the criteria of patentability proper to patent law,
whereby a mere discovery cannot be patented". 6 It is thus apparent that when the
EU entered the field in 1998 it injected a new set of values into the then existing
European patent system. Indeed, this was a central reason for the Court of Justice
of the European Union's (CJ.E.U.'s) rejection of the Dutch challenge to the validity
of the Directive as "undermininghuman dignity" by "reducting]living human matter
to a means to an end",2 7 namely, that the Directive observes "the generalprinciplesof
Community law", including "the fundamental right to human dignity and integrity".?2
Ten years later that right was given a more explicit form and basis in the EUs
-constitutional fabric with the elevation of the European Charter on Fundamental

23

In relation to industry see Recitals 1, 20, 22, 24; Art. 5(3). In relation to research see
Recitals 2, 10, 11, 14,17, 18,45.

24
25

Recital 43.
The source of this principle is Art 27.1, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights.

26

See Recitals 16, 38. Cf Recital 34 ("Wereas this Directive shall be without prejudice to
concepts of invention and discovery, as developed by national, European or international

patent law".) While human dignity had been raised in argument in Howard Florey, the
Division responded to the argument dismissively, due in part to its narrow conception

27
28

of Article 53(a) generally. See Howard Florey [6.1, [6.3].
C-377/98 Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the
European Union [2001] ECRI-07079, [69] [European Court of Justice]. [Hereinafter,
"Netherlands"].
Netherlands [701-[71.
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Rights of the European Union (Charter) 9 to the status of the EU Treaties,' and
the imposition of an obligation on the EU to accede to the Council of Europe's
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(E.C.H.R.).Y1

III. THE CROWDED HOUSE OF EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND
ITS CONVERGENCE AROUND SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES
European patent law is an increasingly crowded house with no clearly
defined boundaries and no clear hierarchy of legal norms. As mentioned above, its
foundational legislative instruments are the S.P.C. and E.PC., both of which are the
products of intergovernmental agreements negotiated over a period of more than
20 years by the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community and two
specially-convened diplomatic conferences.?2 The E.P.C. is of particular importance
due to its creation of a system for the grant of European patents and the E.P.O. to
administer it. It was concluded in 1973 and later revised several times, including
to incorporate the Biotech Directive.? Consistent with the nature of a "European
patent" as a bundle of national (E.P.C. Member State) patents, it is implemented
and supplemented by those States' national laws, at least some of which must
be interpreted consistently with the Boards' interpretation of the E.P.C?' By its
incorporation of the Biotech Directive, it is also the subject of EU jurisprudence,
including decisions of the C.J.E.U., which take constitutional priority over decisions
of national courts and the E.P.O. in all EU Member States, but which are not binding
on the E.P.O. as a non-EU entity. Finally, and by its concern with property and
29

30

31

32
33
34

OJ C 364/1 (December 18, 2000. See Arts. 1 ("Human dignity"), 3 ("Right to the
integrity of the person"), See also of current relevance Arts. 13 ("Freedom of the arts and
sciences"); 17 ("Right to property", including intellectual property), 35 ("Health care"),
37 ("Environmentalprotection").
See The Treaty on European Union (T.E.U.) OJ C 83/13 (March 30, 2010) Art. 6(1)
(recognizing "the rights,fnedoms andprinciplesset out in the Charterof FundamentalRights
of the European Union of 7 December 2000" as having "the same legal value as the Treaties").
Rome, 4 November 1950, E.T.S. 5 (as amended). See T.E.U. Art. 6(2); Protocol (No. 8)
Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of the Union
to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
For the history see J. PiuA, THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INVENTION 126 (2010) et seq.
See E.P.C. Implementing Regulations ch. V ("Biotechnological inventions").
See, e.g,, Patents Act, 1977 (UK) s. 130(7), transposed directly from the Resolution on
the Adjustment of National Patent Law annexed to the C.P.C.
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other 'fundamental rights", it is the subject of decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights, which, while not formally binding, are recognized as an important
source of human rights jurisprudence, and the starting point for interpretation of
the CharterY5
As this brief overview demonstrates, the European patent system comprises
several overlapping European and national regimes, each of which differs in its
basis and coverage. The Charter and EC.H.R. deal with fundamental rights,
including the rights of (intellectual) property. The Directive deals with the patenting
of biotechnology, including issues of patentability and patent scope. The E.P.C.
deals with the pre-grant aspects of a patent's life, and incorporates the provisions
of the Biotech Directive. National laws deal with all pre- and post-grant aspects
of a patent's life, and mostly incorporate and recognize the Biotech Directive and
3
E.P.C., in addition to the Charter and E.C.H.R.M
The institutional complexity which this suggests is exacerbated by the
opacity of the formal relationship between each of the relevant European and
national regimes. The Council of Europe, E.P.O. and EU are all autonomous legal
communities with their own claims to legal supremacy? And similarly most
35

See Art. 5(3) Charter (requiring that rights corresponding to E.C.H.R. rights be given
at least the same meaning and scope as their E.C.H.R. counterparts); also C-94/00
Roquette Freres SA v. Directeur General de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et
de la Repression des Fraudes and Commission [2002] ECRI-9011 [European Court of
Justice], and with respect to UK law, the Human Rights Act, 1998 (UK). For a discussion
of Strasbourg jurisprudence with respect to intellectual property, see L. Helfer, The
New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Propertyand the European Court of Human Rights,
49 HARVARD INTRNA1TONAL LAW JOURNAL, 1-52 (2008).

36
37

Poland and the UK have sought to limit the application of the Charter in their respective
countries; see Protocol (No. 30) on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom.
The Council of Europe describes itself as "a pan-Europeanhuman rightsprotection system"
and "unique and powerj'ful propagatorof civilized values and democraticgrowth" committed
to the goal of common standards. (Council of Europe, The Council ofEurope: 800 Million
Europeans: Guardian of Human Rights, Democracy and Law available at www.coe.int/
AboutCoe/mediaiinterface/publications/0(Lmillions.en.pdf (last accessed January
29, 2012) p. 5). According to a 2009 decision of the E.P.O.'s Enlarged Board of Appeal,
the European Patent Organisation comprises an autonomous legal community; "an
international,intergovernmentalorganisation,modeled on a modem state order and based on
the separationof0oers principle, which the sovereign contractingstates have entrusted with
the exercise of some of their nationalpowers in the field of patents." (G-03/08 (PRESIDENT'S
REFERENCE/Computerprogram exclusion) [2011] O EPO 10, [7.2.1].) So too according to
the CJ.E.U. in Costa v. Enelmore than 50 years ago, the EU comprises an autonomous
legal community; "a community of uniimited duration, having its own institutions,it own
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane
and, more particularly,real pouers stemming fror a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of
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European states continue to regard themselves as autonomous and supreme within
their territorial spheres, if only by virtue of their ability to denounce their regional
commitments and memberships,' In Europe there would thus seem to be two
independent European patent systems, in addition to the two European human
rights systems, and the (patents and human rights) systems of the various states,
each of which interacts with the others in different and complex ways.
In the light of this, it is hardly surprising that the hierarchy of European
patentability norms is also somewhat opaque. The formal position of European
states is that such EU norms as exist take precedence over conflicting norms of the
E.P.C. and national law, followed in most jurisdictions by the norms of the E.P.C.
unless they (or the EU norms) are thought to be constitutionally or otherwise
inappropriate. 39 The formal position of the EU and E.P.O. is that their own norms
take priority; the EU not being an E.P.C. Contracting State and the E.P.O. not being
a Member of the EU. This, in combination with the facts that most European states
will have divided E.P.C./EU loyalties, that EU patent law has limited coverage,
and that the E.P.O. alone has technical and patent law expertise, make the reality
even more complex than the formal position of states might suggest it to be.
And this is without considering the E.C.H.R. and its associated jurisprudence, to
which the Charter and some national laws are seemingly subordinate, nor indeed
international norms and bilateral agreements.
On the European plane, the difficulties which potentially arise from the
existence of (at least) four independent but overlapping European systems informed
by'different values and governing principles will be immediately apparent,
particularly in an area as ethically sensitive and culturally embedded as the granting
of property rights to scientific researchers in respect of elements of the human body.
One need only consider the Directives extrapolation of the public ordre/morality

38

powers from the member] states to the community" (C-14/64 Costa v. ENELl1964] CMLR
425 (C.J.E.U.) 455. See also Declaration 17 of the Lisbon Treaty concerning primacy.)
See Art. 174 E.P.C. ("Any Contracting State may at any time denounce this Convention.
Denunciation shall be notified to the Government of the FederalRepublic of Germany. It shall

39

take effect one year after the date of receipt of such notification."); for the UK, [LoRD] T.
BTNOHAM, THE RuLE OF LAW 164 (2010) (the curtailment by the European Communities
Act 1972 of British parliamentary sovereignty "takes effect by express authority of the
Westminster Parliament,which, at least theoretically,it retains the power to revoke ")
On the UK courts' approach to E.PO. jurisprudence see Human Genome Services
Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co. [20111 UKSC 51, [87] [UK Supreme Court]. On the German
Constitutional Court's approach to EU jurisprudence, see InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft,
[1974] CMLR 540 [German Constitutional Court]; Wilnsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3
CMLR 225 [German Constitutional Court]; D.Halberstam and C. Moellers, The German
ConstitutionalCourt says: 'Jazu Deutschland', 10 GERMAN LAw JOURNAL, 1241-58 (2009).
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exclusion to appreciate this. According to Article 6(2), that exclusion requires that
.the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable:
a)
b)
c)
d)

processes for cloning human beings;
processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings;
uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes;
processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely
to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or
animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.

It is presumably in recognition of the difficulties which would result if
the E.P.O. were to diverge on these exclusions that it has to date seemed intent
on forging a common path by converging around the principles of the Biotech
Directive. Evidence of that convergence ranges from the E.P.O.'s incorporation of
the Directive's Articles into the E.P.C. 4 to its recent embrace of the EU model of
democratic governance based (inter alia) on "the rule of law and respect for human

rights". 1 This embrace seems significant, and partly if not entirely to explain its
2008 decision in WARFIStem Cells.42 There the E.P.O.'s Enlarged Board of Appeal
combined concern for human dignity with a conservative approach to statutory
interpretation to find that the E.P.C. provision incorporating Article 6(2)(c) forbids
the patenting of any subject matter the preparation or performance of which
requires the destruction of human embryos. In the Board's analysis, the absence of
a European definition of "embryo", the "straightfortward" meaning of the exclusion
"on its face", and the European legislators' concern to protect human dignity
by preventing the commodification of human embryos, require an expansive
interpretation of the exclusion to cover any patent application the teaching of which
involves the use of an embryo for industrial or commercial purposes. Invited to
support a more flexible interpretation which would enable the Office to weigh the
benefits and risks of an invention in any individual case - in effect the approach
of Onco-Mouse - the Board responded dismissively: "The legislators have decided,
remainingwithin the ambit of Article 53(a) E.P.C., and there is no roomfor manoeuvre."4

40
41

42

For Art. 6 E.P.C. see Rule 28 E.P.C. Implementing Regulations.
See President's Reference, [7.2.1] ("These principles have been subscribed to in substance at
national level by all the E.P.C. contracting states, despite differing constitutional traditions
and despite several reservations made by different states, As a democracy is prohibitedfrom
signing an internationaltreaty which would undermineits citizens' constitutionalguarantees,
the E.PO. must therefore support these fundamental principles either explicitly (e.g. Art.113
E.P.C. ["right to be heard and basis of decisionl) or implicitly (e.g. liberty, equality).")
G_2/06 (WARF/Stem Cells), 12009] EPOR 15. [Hereinafter, "Warf'l
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Warf, [31].

1.

Some Reflections on Method and Policy in the Crowded House
As I have elsewhere argued, there is reason to be skeptical about the E.P.O.'s
purported respect for democracy, including for the limited constitutional remit
of its Boards (and President)." Consistent with this, it is ironic that the E.P.O.
asserted its commitment to democracy and the rule of law in the very case in
which it (unconvincingly) rejected an acteclairedoctrine under the E.P.C., thereby
entrenching its Technical Board of Appeal as the first and last tribunal in the vast
majority of European patent cases. 45 And Warf may be viewed as further cause for
skepticism, due to the means by which the E.P.O. achieved its particular end in that
case. That means was to invoke some of the very factors invoked in Howard Florey
to read the public ordre/morality exclusion down to read its "human embryo" subset
up, in a dramatic reversal of European legal logic. Those factors include the absence
of a consensus among Contracting States as to an aspect of the exclusion (in Warf
the meaning of "human embryo"), and the appropriate interpretative approach to
the public ordre/morality exclusion generally.
The EU's influence on the E.P.O. can hardly be doubted, and is perhaps
unsurprising given the supremacy of EU law in most E.P.C. Contracting States, and
its explicit concern to expand its involvement in the field of European patent law.
That the EU has in turn been influenced by the E.P.O. is also apparent, not only from
the terms of the Biotech Directive as discussed above, but also from subsequent
C.J.E.U. cases. A key example is Brilstle v. Greenpeace," where the Court was asked
to consider whether claims for purified and isolated neural precursor cells were
invalid under Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive. Relying substantially on Warf, and
the need to ensure that "the application of patent law ... 'respect the fundamental
principles safeguardingthe dignity and integrity of the person', 47 it decided that they
were, notwithstanding the applicant's intention to use the cells exclusively for
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45

46
47

See J. Pila, (Software Patents,SeparationofPowers, and Failed Syllogisms: A Cornucopiafrom
the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office] 70 CAMBRIDGE LAw JOURNAL,

203-28 (2011).
G_3/08 came about as a result of a request by the UK Court of Appeal for a referral
by the E.P.O. President of certain questions regarding patentability to the Enlarged
Board. The link between that request and the acteclairedoctrine was made by Sir Robin
Jacob in an unpublished paper delivered at a public conference in Oxford on January
8, 2012.
C-34/10 Briistle v. Greenpeace eV [C.J.E.U.]. [Hereinafter, "Briastle"]
Brfistle, [32].

Vol. 24(l)

NationalLaw School of India Review

2012

research, and on the basis of an expansive definition of "human embryo"." Just
as the E.PO.'s decision in Waif seems to have been influenced by its concern to
demonstrate its comfort with "human rights", so too it seems plausible to suggest
that the C.J.E.U.'s decision in Briistle was influenced, in part at least, by its concern
to demonstrate its comfort with science and technology.49 Hence my suggestion,
that "substantive convergence" around principles is inevitable but unsatisfactory,
as it will generally be the product of complex institutional dynamics as much as
principled policy making.

IV. DIVERGENCE

OVER METHODOLOGY AND POLICY AS AN

IMPEDIMENT TO COHERENT AND CONSISTENT EUROPEAN

PATENT LAW
Following publication, Briistle was criticized by scientists for failing
properly to consider the needs of scientific and medical research and society as its
beneficiary.0 The criticism connects with a certain expectation among academics
regarding the consequences of "constitutionalising" intellectual property (I.P.),
namely, that it would put I.P. on a par with other social and economic rights so as to
permit, and indeed require, that they be "balanced" by tribunals in individual cases51
48

49

50

51

See Briistle [35]-J36] (defining "human embryo" to include "any human ovum ... as soon
as fertilized .. since thatfiertilization is such as to commence the process of development of a
human being", and any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from
a mature human cell has been transplanted and any non-fertilised human ovum
whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis).
In Warf it was not considered necessary to define "human embryo" as the description
of the invention made it clear that use of a pre-implantation embryo was necessary to
produce the cells.
The C.J.E.U. is often critized for alleged lack of technical expertise, particularly in patent
law where such expertise is comnonly regarded as essential. See, e.g., Department of
Business Innovation and Skills, European Scrutiny Committee, "Documents Considered
by the Committee on 20 December 2011: Draft Agreement on a Unified Patent Court
and draft Statute", Paper 11533/1(December 20,2011) [2.1] (reporting industry concerns
that the currently proposed Unified European Patent Court would lack the technical
expertise required to adjudicate matters of patent law).
See e.g., I. Sample, European Court outlaws patents on embryonic stem cell techniques. The
ban will stifle research investbent in potential stem cell treatments for conditions such as
dementia, say scientists Tir GUARDIAN (October 18, 2011), available at www.guardian.
co.uk/science/2011/oct/18/european-patents-embryonic-stem-cells (last accessed
January 30, 2012). The criticism ignores that the effect of ap plying the public ordre/
morality exclusion is not to constrain the freedom to research but to rather to decide
that research may not be constrained by the grant of monopoly rights.
See e.g., C. Geiger, 'Constitutionalising' Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW, 371-406 (2006).

Some Reflections on Method and Policy in the Crowded House
For some that expectation has been disappointed by the terms of the Charter, which
have been said to promote a "maximalist conception" of I.? and thereby unbalance
the scales against society.- The ambivalence reflects the difficulties inherent in
any legal method which depends on a "balancing" of competing interests and
principles, for what interests and principles are relevant and in "competition", what
is required to "balance" them, and when and by whom are they appropriately to be
"balanced"? These are difficult and contestable issues, and failing to engage with
them directly can give the impression that appeals to "balance" are merely cloaking
disagreement over method and policy.5 The suggestion of the decisions in Warf
and EBristle is that they ought to be answered as follows. First, the principles of
primary relevance to patentability are the procedural principles flowing from the
EU's restricted patent authority, including those of subsidiarity and respect for
national sovereignty, and the substantive principles flowing from the E.C.H.R., the
Charter, and the constitutional traditions of Member States, including those of the
dignity and integrity of the person, health care and environmental protection, the
freedom of the arts and sciences, and the protection of IP. Second, the balancing
of these principles requires that their implications for patentability be considered
and inform determinations of the content of substantive norms, which are then
appropriately expressed statutorily. When reasoning from that content to a decision
in a particular case, it is not appropriate for a tribunal to return to the relevant
principles with a view to "re-balancing" them on the ground that they will already
have been taken into account by the legislators. Central in that regard is the latters'
decision as to how much weight the principles ought to have, and their relationship
inter se. From recital 16 of the Biotech Directive it is apparent that a principle of
primary importance in European patent law is that of safeguarding the dignity
and integrity of the person, and that this principle is the basis for the Article 5(1)
52

See C. Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall be Protected! Article 17(2) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: a mysterious provision with an unclear scope,
EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW, 113-17 (2009); also A. Peukert, Intellectual

property as an end in itself?, EUROPEAN
53

54

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

REVIEW,

67-71 (2011).

See eg., J. C. Ginsburg, "European Copyright Code - Back to First Principles (with
some additional detail)," Auteurs et Midias, (2011) forthcoming (preprint at ssrn.com/
abstract=1747148) (noting of the Wittem Group's proposed European Copyright Code
that "while the rhetoricof 'balance' imbues the text, on closer inspection 'balance' often seems
to resemble a coded version of'cutting back on exclusive rights"'). On "balancing"in general
see T. Harbo, The Function of the ProportionalityPrinciplein EU Law, 16 EUROPEAN LAW
JOURNAL, 15845 (2010); but cfM. Andenas and S. Zleptnig, Proportionality:WTO Law:
in Comparative Perspective, 42 TEXAs INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 371-423 (2007).
Even after Onco-Mouse, references to the need to "balance" the competing interests
in respect of an invention when applying the public ordre/morality exclusion received
occasional support from the E.P.O., reflecting its continued ambivalence as to the
proper method of determining the limits to European patentability. See, e.g., LELAND
STANFORD/Modified Animal, [2002] EPOR 2 (European Patent Office].
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and 6(2) exclusions, in addition to informing the essential distinction between
(inherently patentable) inventions and (inherently unpatentable) discoveries. It
follows as a matter of methodology at least that criticisms of the Warf and Bristle
tribunals as having over-emphasised human dignity may be misconceived, for
having considered all relevant (Charter and E.C.H.R.) principles, and in the absence
of relevant constitutional constraints, the comparative importance of human
dignity within the European patent system is a matter of legislative policy. What
may be concerning is the use of identical considerations and principles - such as
agreement between Contracting States (which may be linked to "respectfor national
sovereignty") and the proper approach to interpreting patentability exclusions - in
seemingly contradictory ways; unless human dignity is not merely the basis for
the public ordre/morality exclusion, but the emergent foundation of the European
patent system more generally, such that a shift in the policy and methodology of
HowardFlorey was not only appropriate, but necessary. While this suggestion may
seem far-fetched, it draws attention to a peculiar feature of patent jurisprudence,
which is its failure (in comparison with copyright, for example) to consider exactly
how encouraging innovation benefits society, and what values beyond technology
and research underpin the European patent system? If patent law were conceived
as the engine rather than the competitor of human dignity - just as copyright is
often conceived as the engine of freedom of expression and personal autonomy - it
might even be possible to agree that the purpose of the European patent system is
the appropriate reference point for assessing its substantive norms, as US courts
and commentators would have it.
Whatever one's view on the relationship between patent law and human
rights, one thing which emerges clearly from European patent law's treatment of
natural phenomena is the importance which issues of legal methodology and policy
have assumed in the European patent system. This supports the argument above
that "substantive convergence" around principles is not enough to ensure legal
coherence and consistency; one also needs a unified methodology and agreement
over policy.5

V. CONCLUSION
The aim of this discussion has been to reflect on the importance which issues
of legal methodology have in the European patent system, including the way in
which the weight of legal norms is determined and decisions are presented (ie.,
justified) to the public. The importance of these two aspects of legal method is
particularly apparent in IP, where legal norms vary between jurisdictions in form,
55

The argument is consistent with at least some of the claims made in L.Alexander and
K.Kress, Against Legal Principles,82 IowA LAw REvIEw, 739-86 (1996-1997).

Some Reflections on Method and Policy in the Crowded House
substance, and justificatory basis, and are accordingly weighted and presented
differently by different law- and decision-makers. 6 While copyright may remain
the best source of examples of this phenomenon, the statement is true for patent
law as well, as the recent decision in Human Genome Sciences Inc. v. Eli Lilly and

Co. (H.G.S.) 57 demonstrates. According to the UK Supreme Court in that case, the
purpose of the patent system is to ensure the ability of companies to attract funding
at an early stage of their research and development in order to be able to do the
further work required to establish the value of their claimed discoveries. 8 This
view - which arguably informs the criticisms of Brastle above - seems to have been

important to the Court's decision in H.G.S.to accept the E.P.O. principle, that where
the discovery is of a protein, the disclosure of an "educated guess" as to its use or
benefit will satisfy the requirement for susceptibility of industrial application.- The
decision has relevance here for several reasons. The first concerns the Court's view
that while European tribunals may reach different conclusions in parallel cases on
procedural and evidentiary grounds,W the lower courts' purported application of
E.P.O. principles in H.G.S.was irreconcilable with their conclusion on the facts,"
justifying its reversal by the Supreme Court. The decision recognizes the difficulty
of distinguishing substantive and methodological principles, and challenges
the historical tolerance of methodological diversity among European tribunals.
Second, by determining the content of the susceptibility of industrial application
requirement with reference to the purpose of the system overall, the decision
suggests agreement with the premise of the US approach, that substantive aspects
of patentability ought properly to be determined having regard to that purpose,
and without consideration of other relevant principles. Third, and consistent
56

On the role of method in European private law generally see M. Hesselinjk, A European
Legal Method? On EuropeanPrivateLaw and Scientific Method, 15

EUROPEAN LAw JOURNAL,

20-45 (2009).
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Human Genome Sciences Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co. (H.G.S.) [2011] UKSC 51 [UK Supreme

Court]. Hereinafter, "HGS" Lord Neuberger delivered the main opinion and the
citations below are from his reasoning.
HGS, [99].
FIGS, [107l, [1231.
See HGS, [85] ("ITlhe E.P.O. (or another national court) and a national court may come to
different conclusions because they have different evidence orarguments, orbecause they assess
the same competing arguments and factual or expert evidence differently, or, particularlyin
a borderline case, because they form different judgments on the same view of the expert and
factual evidence.")
HGS, [1051-[111]. The lower courts had found that the use disclosed in the patent
application was purely "speculative", and thus insufficient to justify a patent even
applying those principles. For the decision of the Court of Appeal see [20101 EWCA
Civ. 33 [England & Wales Court of Appeal].
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with its "prospect" theory of patents, 62 the decision supports a differentiated test
of patentability according to the nature of the particular invention, and the rights
required to enable the patentee to attract the funding required further research and
development. And fourth, and notwithstanding its application of E.P.O. authorities,
the decision sits uneasily with the provisions of the Biotech Directive "that the
function of a patent is to rewardthe inventor for his creative efforts" (for the benefit of
industry and research), that "the grantingof a patentfor inventions which concern such
sequences or partialsequences should be subject to the same criteriaof patentabilityas in all
other areas of technology", and that "[tihe industrialapplicationof a sequence or a partial
sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application" in order for the gene to

be patentable." Hence my suggestion, that the case represents another example of
"substantive convergence" in Europe masking a persistent divergence over methods
and policy, and proving insufficient to ensure coherence and consistency in patent
law. Hence also my suggestion, that there exists a need for greater consideration of

both in the European patent system today.
Of course, the same suggestions may be apposite outside of Europe, with
respect to the international patent system. For example, TRIPS is similar in its
stated aims to the IP clause of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union;' and while the World Trade Organization lacks the constitutional (and
social rights) dimension of the EU, TRIPS itself recognizes the freedom of its
member states to import that dimension from their national legal and constitutional

systems." For these reasons alone, the Indian experience under TRIPS makes an
interesting comparator to the experiences of European states under the E.P.C. and
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As Lord Hoffmann pointed out in his Hilary Term F.H.S. Patent Law seminars at the
University of Oxford in 2012, the theory of patents supported by the Supreme Court in
HGS is effectively that argued for in E. W. Kitch's classic work, The Nature and Function
of the Patent System, 20 JOURNAL OF LAW AND EcoNoMIcs, 265-90 (1977), namely, that
patents are prospects for developing technological opportunities.
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See Recitals 46, 22; Art. 5(3) E.P.C.
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Cf. ns 4, 6.
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See TRIPS Arts. 7 & 8 ("The protection and enforcement of intellectualproperty rightsshould
contribute to the promotionof technological innovationand to the transferand disseminationof
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations"
(Art. 7); "Members may, informulatingor amending their laws and regulations,adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement" (Art. 8(1)), and its Preambles
("irlecognizing the underlying publicpolicy objectives of nationalsystemsfor the protection of
intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives" and "the special
needs of the least-developedcountry Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base").

Some Reflections on Method and Policy in the Crowded House
EU law. For a UK commentator, India offers a particularly interesting case study
because of its roots in the British patent system and through it in the English
Statute of Monopolies 1 6 2 3 .MAs is well known, the Statute of Monopolies codified
a constitutional prohibition against monopoly grants and a limited exception
thereto for patents for "manners of new manufacture".6 7 That exception had as its
purpose the encouragement of local industry, and was subject to a proviso that
the relevant manufacture "be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by
raisingprices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade,or generallyinconvenient". 8 With
some important exceptions,69 the judicial assumption in the UK has been that the
Government's adoption of the E.P.C. in 1977 detached the UK system from its
(Statute of Monopolies) roots and re-aligned it with the philosophy of the E.P.C., as
subsequently developed by the Technical Boards of the E.P.O. The result has been
the UK courts' abandonment of certain important pre-1977 limitations on patent
protection, such as the requirement for fairly based claims, the prohibition against
patents for inventions in public use, and the narrow conception of products-asinventions (and thus of the protection which product patents conferred),n as well
as a shift in their concern from promoting local industry to harmonization and
technology (whatever that may mean!). 1
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21Jac lc. 3.
English Statute of Monopolies 1623 s. 6. For a detailed discussion see Pita (note 32) ch.
1.
Supra note 66, at S.6..
See, e.g., Oakley Inc.v. Animal Ltd. & Ors, [2005] EWHC 210 (Ch) t23]-[251 [English

and Wales High Court] (Mr Peter Prescott Q.C.: "According to the constitution of the
United Kingdom the government (i.e. the Executive) cannot grant or regulate monopolies, or
rights in the nature of monopolies, unless and to the extent that it has been authorisedto do
so by Parliament.This was established long ago: The Case of Monopolies, (1602) 11 Co Rep
84b; The Clothworkers of Ipswich Case, (1615) Godbolt 252; The Statute of Monopolies, 1623
(21 Jac 1 c 3). Failureto respect that principle was one of the many causes of the English Civil
War. ... The framing of legislation which governs tradingmonopolies requires the making of
difficult policy choices, There are competing constituencies and a delicate balance has to be
struck between them.... The accommodation of all these interests is pre-eminently a matter

for the legislature. Accordingly, patents, registered designs, copyrights and similar rights are
regulated by Act of Parliament.For patents, we have the PatentsAct 1977...").
70 On the first and last of these limitations, and their demise since the introduction of
the Patents Act, 1977 (UK), see J.Pila, Chemical PToducts and ProportionatePatents Before
and After Generics v. Lundbeck 20 KING's LAw JOURNAL, 489-521 (2009). On the second
compare Bristol-Meyers Co. (Johnson's) Application, [19751 RPC 127 (H.L.) [House of
Lords] and Synthon B.V.v.Smithkline Beecham plc., [2005] UKHL59 [House of Lords].
71 On the opacity of "technology" and related concepts, and their consequential
inappropriateness as gatekeepers for patentability, see Pila (notes 32, 44).
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By contrast, the same shift in patent (and social) policy seems not to have
occurred in India following its entry to the World Trade Organization and TRIPS
on 1 January 1995. Not only does Indian law maintain its pre-1995 skepticism
with respect to patent rights,7 it continues to regard the Indian patent system as
"a carefully crafted bargain that rewards an inventor in lieu of his contribution towards
the society fin taking] the nation towards socio-economicprosperity"P Consistent with
this, local economic and social concerns - namely, "mischievous[ness] to the state",
the "raising[oft pricesof commodities at home" and "general[]inconvenience" - continue
to provide legal and, indeed, constitutional grounds for refusing or limiting patent
protection, including by denying injunctive relief, 7 granting compulsory licences,h
and requiring a higher standard of inventive step in respect of pharmaceutical
substances76 Hence the statement by the High Court of Madras in Novartis,
supported on appeal by the I.PA.B, that the TRIPS Agreement "provides enough
72
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This skepticism is best reflected in the Indian Patents Act of 1970, which abolished
patents for products, halved the duration of patent protection from 14 to seven years,
excluded medicines, pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs and other products from patentability
and introduced an expansive compulsory licensing regime.
Natco Pharma Ltd v. Bayer Co. (Controller of Patents, March 9, 2012) 1-2.
See e.g., Franz Zaver Huemer v. New Yesh Engineers (Delhi High Court, Nov. 11, 1995)
(deciding that applications for injunctive relief must be decided having regard (among
other things) to the impact of granting such relief on local investment and employment,
public health (including public access to a life saving drug), and product quality and
price); Hindustan Lever Ltd v. Godrej Soaps Ltd(Calcutta High Court, April 11, 1996)
(refusing an application for injunctive relief on the basis in part of the patentee's
failure to use the invention in India, and following the defendant's argument that if
injunctive relief were to be granted, it would displace local workers and production);
F Hoffmann-LA Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd, (2009) 159 D.L.T. 243 [High Court of Delhil
[73], [79] (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the grant of a patent must "be taken

to be in the public interest" and deciding that "in a country like India where [the] question
ofgeneral public access to life savin$ drugs assuumes greatsignificance, the adverse impact on
such access which the grantof [an] injunction ... is likely to have, mould have to be accounted
for" by a court in deciding whether to grant such relief).
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See e.g., Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Co. (Controller of Patents, March 9, 2012),
[Hereinafter, "Natco"J discussed below.
See Patents Act 1970 (as amended) s. 3(d) ("themere discovery of a new form of a known
substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that
substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance
or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known
process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. Explanation.For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure
form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other
derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless
they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy;").
See Novartis v. Union of India (I.P.A.B., June 26, 2009) [Hereinafter, "Novartis"]
especially p. 190. As noted in the Introduction, the decision in Novartis is currently
before the Indian Supreme Court.

Some Reflections on Method and Policy in the Crowded House
elbow room to a member country in complying with [its] obligations by bringing a law
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to a balance of rights and
obligations",and that the purpose of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 was
precisely to exploit that "elbow room" in order "to prevent evergreening, to provide
easy access to the citizens of this country to life saving drugs and to discharge[the State's]
Constitutionalobligation of providing good health care to its citizens"!, On March 9,
2012, the same view was expressed by the Controller of Patents in support of his
decision to grant the first compulsory licence ever to be granted to an Indian generic
drug manufacturer under Chapter XVI of the Patents Act 1970 (as amended)." The
patent in question was for a liver and kidney cancer drug which the Controller
found the US patentee, Bayer Corporation, to have made available "to a little above
2% of the eligible [Indian]patients" during the four years since its grant,80 and at a
price that was (in the Controller's opinion) "too high and simply unaffordable by the
common [Indian]man" Y Considering the implications of this decision for the TRIPS
Agreement, the Controller stated as follows.
Even though the TRIPS Agreement marked a new era of obligations regarding
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property, WTO Members retained
important policy options, flexibilities and safeguards, including the liberty to
determine the grounds for issuing compulsory licenses. In addition, certain key
terms relating to TRIPS obligations are not defined in the Agreement itself, which
leaves considerable discretion to WTO Members as to how to apply the criteria
within their national laws. The use of these policy options and other flexibilities
can directly or indirectly help the low and middle-income countries to achieve
a balance between intellectual property protection and specific developmental
priorities, including the attainment of national public health objectives. 2
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Supra note 6at 15,19. See also 17 (describing the primary purpose of the Indian Patents
Act 1970 as being the same as that of its predecessor, namely, "to safeguardthe economic
interestsof[India]", and as depending for its validity on its consistency with the Indian
Constitution); R. Ayyanger, Report on the Revision of the Patent Laws (Government of

India, 1959) (describing the main purpose of the Indian patent system as being "to
stimulate invention among Indians and to encourage the development and exploitation of
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new inventionsfor industrialpurposes in the country so as to secure the benefits thereof to the
largestsection of the public").
Natco.
Natco, 22.
Natco, 24.
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Natco, 40-41.
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Of particular interest for current purposes is the latter part of this statement,
and that of the I.P.A.B. in Novartis quoted above, in which India's national public
health objectives and citizens' right to health care services are invoked as limits
on the reach of its patent protection. The primary source of the right to health care
particularly is the protection of human dignity, which the Indian Supreme Court
has interpreted Article 21 of the Constitution to confer.8 According to that Article,
"InJo person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law."8' By relying on this constitutional guarantee to limit patent
protection, India has, to date at least, met its international obligation to harmonize
its laws without discarding the foundational values of its national system.85 It would
be ironic indeed if the tempering effects of E.U. jurisprudence on the European
patent system were to encourage a reversion within the UK to those values as well,
by precipitating convergence around the principle of "human dignity". 6
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On the right to life as including a right to human dignity see Frances Coralie Mullin
v. Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 2 SCR 516 [Supreme Court of India]. On the right to
human dignity as including a right to health care see Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union
of India, (1984)2 SCR 67 [Supreme Court of India]. For a discussion of these and other
relevant cases see Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT), Legal
PositionPaper on Right to Health Care (Part II);
available at http://www.cehat.org/rthc/
paper3.htm (last accessed March 12, 2012).
See also Arts. 42, 47, Ch. IV,Constitution of India, 1950.
On the Indian negotiation of these competing considerations see further A.Slade, The
"Objectives" and "Principles" of the TRIPS Agreement: What Significance Do Articles
7 &8 Possess for Interpretation and Implementation of the Agreement? (University of
Oxford D.Phil. thesis, in preparation) ch 5.
On human dignity as a fundamental rights norm see T Khaitar, Dignity as an Expressive
Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea,OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEAL STUDIES, 1-19 (2011).

